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ABSTRACT
The public debate around climate change is increasingly polarized. At the same time, the scientific con-
sensus about the causes and consequences of climate change is strong. This inconsistency poses challenges for
mitigation and adaptation efforts. The translation of uncertain numerical climate projections into simpler
but ambiguous verbal framesmay contribute to this polarization. In two experimental studies, we investigated
1) how ‘‘communicators’’ verbally frame a confidence interval regarding projected change in winter
precipitation due to climate change (N5 512) and 2) how ‘‘listeners’’ interpret these verbal frames (N5 385).
Both studies were preregistered at the Open Science Framework. Communicators who perceived the change
as more severe chose a concerned rather than an unconcerned verbal frame. Furthermore, communicators’
verbal frames were associated with their more general beliefs, like political affiliation and environmental
values. Listeners exposed to the concerned frame perceived climate change–induced precipitation change to
be more severe than those receiving the unconcerned frame. These results are in line with two pilot studies
(N 5 298 and N 5 393, respectively). Underlying general beliefs about climate and the environment likely
shape public communication about climate in subtle ways, and thus verbal framing by the media, policy-
makers, and peers may contribute to public polarization on climate change.
1. Introduction
Public polarization on climate change has intensified
over the past decade. This has been especially severe
in the United States, limiting climate change mitigation
efforts by one of the world’s largest emitters of green-
house gases (Dunlap et al. 2016). Other Western de-
veloped countries face an analogous but less marked
schism (McCright et al. 2016; Hornsey et al. 2016). The
way in which climate change information is communi-
cated to the public may contribute to these divides
(Brüggemann and Engesser 2017; Mossler et al. 2017;
Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011). A particular challenge for
climate change communicators is to communicate the
uncertainty inherent in climate projections (Budescu
et al. 2012, 2014). Uncertain projections are often sum-
marized in ambiguous ways. For example, numeric
projections are translated into verbal expressions (e.g.,
replacing ‘‘more than 90% chance’’ with ‘‘very likely’’).
Such expressions are interpreted inconsistently across
individuals (Budescu et al. 2014; Visschers et al. 2009)
and contexts (Beyth-Marom 1982). These interpretations
may be associated with individuals’ underlying beliefs
and perceptions related to climate change (Budescu et al.
2014) and may vary according to the strength of their
prior beliefs (Benjamin et al. 2017). We examined
whether ‘‘communicators’’ who perceive climate change
impacts to be more severe are more likely to select ver-
bal frames that emphasize their severity concern, and
whether ‘‘listeners’’ exposed to such a frame highlightingCorresponding author: Astrid Kause, a.kause@leeds.ac.uk
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its severity in turn interpret such climate consequences to
be more severe.
a. Verbal frames for summarizing numerical
information
The same numerical information can be framed in
a variety of ways (Cacciatore et al. 2016; Scheufele and
Iyengar 2014). ‘‘Framing effects’’ most famously refer
to the phenomenon in which logically equivalent state-
ments (i.e., each statement necessarily entails the other)
that describe the same numerical information are in-
formationally nonequivalent, such that the choice of
frame influences the listener’s conclusions (Sher and
McKenzie 2006).
Seminal research in decision sciences illustrates that
preferences in a choice task depend on whether the
alternatives are framed as gains or losses. For instance,
a surgery with an 80% survival rate is perceived as more
acceptable than one associated with a 20% mortality
rate. When the two represent the same numbers but
expressed as certain versus uncertain, participants pre-
fer the safe option when the task is framed as a
gain (‘‘800 people saved’’) and the risky option when it
is framed as a loss (‘‘20% probability of 1000 people
dying’’). In other words, individuals’ willingness to ac-
cept risk is dependent on how the decision alternatives
are verbally framed (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
Frame choices might implicitly leak information and
reveal a communicator’s underlying beliefs (McKenzie
and Nelson 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In
health decisions, this may be the surgeon’s underlying
preference regarding their patient’s treatment, when
the same statistical outcome is expressed in different
numerical formats (Marteau 1989; McNeil et al. 1982;
Wilson et al. 1987) or different verbal frames (Mandel
2014). In turn, a listener’s interpretation of two logically
equivalent but informationally distinct statements is
likely to match these underlying cognitions (Sher and
McKenzie 2006; Chong and Druckman 2007). Morton
et al. (2011) demonstrated a related effect in the con-
text of climate change: in the face of uncertainty about
the consequences of climate change, participants were
more willing to behave pro-environmentally when exposed
to a gain frame compared to a loss frame (see also Scannell
and Gifford 2013; Spence and Pidgeon 2010).
While psychological research on framing effects has
typically examined statements that are logically equiv-
alent (Sher and McKenzie 2006), framing has also been
defined more broadly in the sense of which elements are
selected or emphasized (Nelson et al. 1997). Indeed,
framing used in everyday parlance (Cacciatore et al.
2016) may often fail to satisfy the strict definition of
logical equivalence, raising questions about the choice
and effects of such frames. In the context of climate
change communication, we believe that frames that
summarize the same numeric information but are logi-
cally nonequivalent are of particular relevance, and
we will describe them subsequently.
b. Verbal frames summarizing uncertainty in climate
communications
In the academic literature, projections and related un-
certainties are often presented in the form of a mean es-
timate and two confidence interval bounds, a format
rarely found in communication by the media, policy-
makers, or other public figures. Rather, such information
may be summarized verbally, often via verbal frames like
‘‘as much as,’’ ‘‘not more than,’’ or ‘‘as little as.’’ For ex-
ample, an article in The Guardian, describing results from
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Fourth Assessment Report, stated that ‘‘across Africa,
yields from rain-fed agriculture could decline by as much
as 50% by 2020’’ (Clarke 2012; IPCC 2014; see appendix
H). In climate communications, different verbal frames of
the same confidence interval bound may imply different
likelihoods of reaching this bound, and subtly express how
severe the communicator perceives the event to be. The
concerned frame ‘‘could decline by as much as 50%’’ may
imply higher concern and could, in turn, lead those who
receive this statement to perceive climate change conse-
quences as more severe. Conversely, the same results
could have been verbally framed in a less concerned
manner by saying that the ‘‘decline is very unlikely to be
greater than 50%.’’ The latter frame could thus result in
lower levels of perceived severity in recipients.
Furthermore, such communication often omits one
side of the interval (‘‘one-sided uncertainty interval’’;
Teigen 2008). The emphasized side of the uncertainty
interval may reflect the underlying ‘‘provisional refer-
ence point,’’ drawing the listener’s attention to that
same point. The language used to describe the reference
point, in turn, reflects the individual’s beliefs about the
outcome and the directionality of a statement (Teigen
2008): ‘‘More than X’’ implies that a projection is likely
larger than the reference point, whereas ‘‘less than X’’
implies that it is smaller.
Listeners’ interpretations of such statementsmay then
be influenced by verbal frames, along with their own
underlying beliefs and perceptions related to climate
change (Smithson et al. 2012; Teigen et al. 2007). Simi-
larly, the various verbal frames used in climate com-
munication to the public (see appendix H for further
examples). For example, ‘‘as much as X,’’ may empha-
size how extreme the outcome could be. Conversely,
phrasings such as ‘‘unlikely to be more than X’’—as in
the above example from The Guardian, and as used by
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the UK’s Met Office to communicate climate change
projections—may downplay the size of the outcome,
though they refer to the same numeric bound. Addition-
ally, expressions such as ‘‘unlikely’’ may further draw at-
tention toward a less severe outcome. These frames are
logically nonequivalent: ‘‘as much as X’’ does not neces-
sarily entail ‘‘unlikely to be more than X.’’ Yet they are
alternative summaries of the same numeric information—
the upper bound of an uncertainty interval. Thus, while
verbal frames of confidence intervals in climate change
communications may be easier to understand than
numbers, they provide room for selecting and pre-
senting information in line with communicators’ prior
beliefs (‘‘preference-based reinforcement’’; see Cacciatore
et al. 2016).
For studying framing effects in climate communica-
tion, we adopt a broader definition of these (Cacciatore
et al. 2016). Climate information is often framed dif-
ferently by different communicators, but these different
framings rarely fulfill the strict definition of being logi-
cally equivalent. Rather, they often represent different
ways of summarizing the same numerical information,
such as quantitative scientific statements about climate
projections (appendix H). Understanding what these
frame choices reveal about communicators and how
they influence listeners seems crucial to understanding
their contribution to polarization. In this study, we thus
examine a set of verbal frames that, while not logically
equivalent, are used in everyday communications to
summarize uncertain numeric estimates from climate
research—and which may both reflect the communica-
tor’s beliefs and influence the listener’s.
c. Underlying beliefs affect climate risk perceptions
Perceptions of climate change are associated with
political affiliation. For example, Dunlap et al. (2016)
report a 33–47-point difference in the percentage of
Democrats versus Republicans who believed that cli-
mate change is occurring, anthropogenic, and serious;
that there is scientific consensus on climate change; and
that the seriousness of climate change is exaggerated
in the media. Furthermore, political affiliation influ-
ences the interpretation of climate change information
(Carmichael et al. 2017; Hart et al. 2015). For instance,
Malka et al. (2009) showed that increasing knowl-
edge about the scientific findings regarding climate
change increased concern among Democrats and
Independents but not among Republicans. This re-
lationship was moderated by trust in scientists and
mediated by perceptions that climate change is anthro-
pogenic as well as by perceived scientific agreement
about a changing climate. ‘‘Motivated reasoning,’’ in
which individuals interpret information in ways that
reinforce their prior beliefs, may explain these results
(Hart and Nisbet 2012; Hart et al. 2015). Similar to po-
litical affiliation, environmental values are associated
with skepticism about climate change (Poortinga et al.
2011; Whitmarsh 2011).
d. Research question and hypotheses
Despite the ubiquity of confidence-interval communi-
cation in the context of climate change, the process of
selecting verbal frames for describing interval bounds is
not well understood. We investigate whether so-called
communicators who perceive climate change impacts to
bemore severe, andwho care about environmental issues
more generally, are more likely to choose a verbal frame
that may emphasize greater concern when describing the
upper confidence interval bound of a climate change
projection (study 1). In line with prior findings on framing
effects, we predict that the selected frame will be associ-
ated with levels of perceived severity of an event (pre-
diction 1). Furthermore, we investigate whether so-called
listeners who receive a frame that may be expressing
higher rather than lower concern for describing this
bound, in turn, expect the event to be more severe (study
2). We predict that their perceptions of the projected
change will be influenced by the verbal frame used for
communicating the confidence interval bound (pre-
diction 2). We selected two frames that are commonly
used to communicate climate change projections, al-
though they were not logically equivalent (and thus our
study differs from other studies on framing effects in this
respect). In both studies, we include assessments of po-
litical affiliation as well as environmental values, levels of
numeracy, and levels of education. We anticipate an in-
teraction between the participants’ political affiliation
and the frame to which they were exposed in study 2:
specifically, we predict that participants who identify as
Democrats will be more influenced by the more con-
cerned frame than those who identify as Republicans
(prediction 3).
We preregistered both studies on the Open Science
Framework. Study materials and power analyses were
based on two pilot studies conducted in 2013 (N 5 298
and N 5 393, respectively; see https://osf.io/3tr4h/).
Results of these studies provided initial support for the
aforementioned hypotheses. To allow the reader to as-
sess replicability, we report pilot results in appendixes
B–F. Datasets from themain studies are also available at
http://review.researchdata.leeds.ac.uk/512/.
2. Study 1
Study 1 assessed whether participants selected verbal
frames for describing an uncertain climate projection in
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line with their underlying levels of perceived severity of
climate change consequences.
a. Materials and methods
1) PARTICIPANTS
We recruited an online convenience sample from the
generalU.S. population viaAmazonMechanical Turk. In
advance of study 1, we conducted a power analysis
for linear logistic regression, based on the pilot data. To
detect an effect similar to the odds ratio of at least
1.44 observed in the pilot for the main independent
variable, a sample of N 5 509 participants was required.
To account for attrition, we increased this number toN5
598 participants. We excluded participants who did not
finish the questionnaire, answered ‘‘other’’ or ‘‘do not
know’’ on the political affiliation scale and did not give an
open-ended answer that would allow us to recategorize
them, or did not answer an attention check question
correctly. This resulted in an overall N 5 512. The aver-
age study duration was Mcommunicators 5 7.48min [stan-
dard deviation (SD) 5 5.81]. Table 1 provides a sample
description and results of statistical comparisons between
the final sample and excluded participants.
2) PROCEDURE AND MEASURES
Communicators received a brief explanation of why
climate projections can be uncertain. They were then
told that Greater London may experience heavier win-
ter precipitation due to climate change. They learned
that there was an 8 out of 10 chance that the change in
winter precipitation will be somewhere between an in-
crease of 3% and an increase of 33%, with the most
likely change being an increase of 15%. A graph
adapted from the Met Office’s 2009 United Kingdom
Climate Projections 2009 report (UKCP09) aimed to
improve understanding of this information (Fig. 1). We
chose this scenario because most American participants
are broadly familiar with London but lack extensive di-
rect experience with the city’s climate, limiting the effect
of prior knowledge and experience on their responses.
They were then asked to imagine explaining this
projection to a friend deciding whether to vote for flood-
resilient infrastructure in the city that would require
considerable government spending. To do so, partici-
pants chose one of two verbal frames summarizing the
projection, likely reflecting different levels of concern
(Table 2; appendix A). We selected the unconcerned
verbal frame ‘‘very unlikely to have increased more
than. . .’’ from the most recent set of climate projections
for theUnitedKingdom (Murphy et al. 2010), where it is
used to describe outcomes at the 10% and 90% interval
bounds. The concerned counterpart, ‘‘could have in-
creased by as much as,’’ was selected because the ‘‘as
much as’’ formulation is commonly used to summarize
numeric projections in climate change communications
to the public (see appendix H).
After selecting one of the framed statements, we mea-
sured participants’ perceptions related to severity of cli-
mate change consequences: A five-item scale included one
general assessment of perceived severity and four questions
concerned with more specific types of outcomes, based on
the 2010 Draft Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for
London (Greater London Authority 2010; Table 2). Re-
sponses across all five items were combined into a single
perceived severity scale (Cronbach’s a 5 0.90).
TABLE 1. Sample characteristics of study 1 and study 2, compared to excluded participants in each study. In each study sample,
participants were excluded because they did not complete questionnaires, did not answer the attention check correctly, or because we
could not categorize them on the political affiliation scale, based on their open-ended answer. When comparing the remaining com-
municators to those excluded, no statistical difference occurred with regard to any of the used measures (all p values . 0.6). Excluded
listeners did not differ in any of the other measures (all p . 0.3).
Study 1 Study 2
Final sample
(N 5 512)
Excluded
participants
Final sample
(N 5 385)
Excluded
participants
Mage (years) 36.23 (SD 5 11.25,
range 5 19–77)
38.67 (13) 37.22 (SD 5 12.43,
range 5 19–79)
37.75 (13.3)
Percentage male 57 27 55 20
Missing: 56 Missing: 45
Levels of education (%) High school or
lower: 13
High school or
lower: 12
High school or
lower: 12
High school or
lower: 9
College: 78 College: 39 College: 73 College: 41
Graduate school: 9 Graduate degree: 6 Graduate school: 15 Graduate school: 6
Missing: 44% Missing: 45
MPolitical_affiliation (SD) 3.39 (1.92) 3.42 (2.09) 3.50 (1.92) 2.79 (1.89)
MEnvironmental_values (SD) 3.69 (0.77) 3.64 (0.70) 3.67 (0.82) 3.77 (0.62)
MNumeracy (SD) 2.31 (1.24) 2.13 (1.19) 2.35 (1.19) 2 (1.12)
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Environmental values were assessed via the 15-item
New Ecological Paradigm scale (NEP; Dunlap et al.
2000) where each item is rated on a scale from 1
(‘‘strongly agree’’) to 5 (‘‘strongly disagree’’). For ex-
ample, participants were asked to rate statements such
as ‘‘When humans interfere with nature it often pro-
duces disastrous consequences’’ and ‘‘Despite our spe-
cial abilities humans are still subject to the laws of
nature.’’ Participants’ average answer across 15 items
was M 5 3.31 (SD 5 0.33). Cronbach’s a 5 0.91 in-
dicated sufficient internal reliability of the NEP scale
and was slightly higher than the validation sample (a 5
0.83; Dunlap et al. 2000). Political affiliation was as-
sessed on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (‘‘strong
Democrat’’) through a midpoint of 4 (‘‘independent’’)
to 7 (‘‘strong Republican’’), as well as two additional
categories ‘‘do not know’’ and ‘‘other.’’ Based on their
explanations in an open-ended text field, participants
who indicated ‘‘other’’ were recategorized on the
Democrat–Republican spectrum (see Table 1; overall
M 5 3.38, SD 5 1.92). Numeracy was assessed with the
adaptive version of the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT;
Cokely et al. 2012; see alsoKahan et al. 2012; Hart 2013).
The average numeracy score wasM5 2.31 (SD5 1.24),
which is slightly lower than in the validation sample
(M 5 2.60, SD 5 1.13; Cokely et al. 2012).1 The BNT
was followed by an attention check ensuring that par-
ticipants carefully read instructions; asking ‘‘Do you like
to do puzzles? This is an attention check, please answer
C) Other’’ including answer categories A–C. De-
mographic measures included age, gender (male, fe-
male, other), and education (some schooling only, high
school diploma or GED, some college, college degree,
some graduate school, graduate degree); see Table 1.
Results were analyzed in R, using the function glm( ) in
the ‘‘stats’’ package. Dominance analysis (Budescu 1993;
Azen and Traxel 2009) was conducted to rank the im-
portance of the predictors. Following LeBreton et al.
(2013) interaction terms were residualized. The Health
FIG. 1. Graphical display of the climate change projection used in both study 1 (communi-
cators) and study 2 (listeners), with accompanying text. The percentage displayed on the x axis
is equivalent to the amount of precipitation change. The area under the curve represents the
likelihoods or probabilities associated with different amounts of precipitation change. The
vertical lines indicate which amount of precipitation change is associated with the 10%, 50%,
and 90% probability levels of the probability density function. Participants received the fol-
lowing description: ‘‘The graph above makes predictions very similar to those made by the
UKCP09. It suggests that there is an 8 out of 10 chance that the change in winter precipitation
will be somewhere between: an increase of 2 percent and an increase of 33 percent. This is
represented by the area between the dashed lines. The central estimate is an increase in 15
percent, which corresponds to the highest point in the curve. Changes that correspond to lower
points on the curve are less likely to occur. The probability that the change in precipitation will
be less than 2 percent or higher than 33 percent is 2 out of 10. This corresponds to the area below
and above the dashed lines.’’
1Numeracy scores were distributed as follows. 1: 38%; 2: 21%;
3: 14%; 4: 28%, where 1 indicates very low numeracy and 4 very
high levels of numeracy. See also Cokely et al. (2012).
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Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review
Board at the second author’s institution approved both
studies.
b. Results
Choices of verbal frames for summarizing uncertain
climate projections are associated with communicators’
underlying perceived severity of climate change: Com-
municators who perceived the consequences of pre-
cipitation change to be more severe were more likely to
choose the concerned frame (N 5 375) than the un-
concerned frame (N 5 137; Fig. 2a). This was in line with
our first prediction, and held when controlling for other
predictors and covariates in the logistic regression
(Table 3). Choice of the concerned frame was further
associated with a more democratic political affiliation2
and rather weakly with environmental values. Partici-
pants with lower levels of numeracy perceived conse-
quences as more severe and were also somewhat more
likely to choose a concerned frame (Table 3). Dominance
analysis (Azen and Traxel 2009) was used for assessing
relative importance of severity, compared to other pre-
dictors. Perceived severity generally dominated all other
predictors, accounting for 49% of the model’s overall fit.
Political affiliation was the second most important pre-
dictor, accounting for 30% of overall fit (appendix D).
A logistic regression model additionally including de-
mographics produced similar patterns. It further in-
dicated that communicators were more likely to choose
the concerned frame if they were male (b 5 0.55 [0.23],
p 5 0.02), if they perceived consequences as severe and
additionally were low in numeracy (severity3 numeracy:
b520.36 [0.14], p5 0.01), or if they additionally had high
pro-environmental values (severity3NEP: b5 0.32 [0.14],
p5 0.02). Including demographics slightly decreasedmodel
fit. This was indicated by the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC), which penalizes additional predictors. The BIC in-
creased from 615 to 652. To ensure the results were robust
to the inclusion of all participants, we predicted perceived
severity using similar models and the full dataset (N 5
598). This revealed similar patterns. Pilot results are de-
scribed in appendixes C, D, and F.
3. Study 2
Study 2 assessed whether two different verbal frames
for describing an uncertain climate projection influ-
enced listeners’ underlying levels of perceived severity
of climate change consequences.
a. Material and methods
1) PARTICIPANTS
Similar to study 1, the online convenience sample was
drawn from the general U.S. population and recruited
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. We conducted a power
analysis for linear regression, based on the pilot data. To
detect a small effect of f2 5 0.05 for our main predictor
(Cohen 1988), a sample of N 5 382 participants was
required. To account for attrition, N 5 456 participants
were invited to participate. We excluded participants
who did not finish the questionnaire, participants who
answered ‘‘other’’ or ‘‘do not know’’ on the political
affiliation scale and did not give an open-ended answer
that would allow us to recategorize them on this scale,
and participants who did not answer an attention check
question correctly (similar to study 1). The final sample
TABLE 2. Items used in both study 1 (communicators) and study 2 (listeners). The projection for precipitation change due to climate
change was retrieved from Murphy et al. (2010).
Verbal frames of confidence interval bound
‘‘A recent report predicts that climate change will increase winter precipitation in Greater London. By the 2050s, winter
precipitation . . .’’
1) ‘‘. . . could have increased by as much as 32%.’’ (concerned frame)
2) ‘‘. . . is very unlikely to have increased by more than 32%.’’ (unconcerned frame)
Perceived severity of consequences Rating scale
How severe do you think an increase in precipitation will be by
the 2050s in London?
1 (‘‘Not severe at all’’) to 7 (‘‘Extremely severe’’)
With what severity do you think London will experience these
potential consequences of flooding by the 2050s?
1) Loss of income and delayed economic development 1 (‘‘No severity at all’’) to 7 (‘‘Extreme severity’’)
2) Contamination and disease from flood and sewer water
3) Direct damage to property, infrastructure and utilities
4) Loss of life and personal injury
2The model from the main study but not of the pilot study fur-
ther indicated a three-way interaction between environmental
values, political affiliation, and levels of numeracy. As these results
were not interpretable and did not replicate findings from the pilot
study, we do not provide descriptive statistics here but report those
in appendix G.
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included N 5 385 participants. The average study du-
ration was Mlisteners 5 7.17min (SD 5 4.69). Sample
characteristics are described in Table 1, including sta-
tistical comparisons to excluded participants.
2) PROCEDURE AND MEASURES
The introductory text was similar to study 1. A total
of N 5 204 participants received a statement from a
London assembly member summarizing evidence from
a reputable source on projected changes in winter pre-
cipitation. The statement was equivalent to the con-
cerned frame of the uncertain projection in Table 2. A
total of N 5 181 participants received a statement
equivalent to the unconcerned frame in Table 2 (ap-
pendix A). Participants were randomly allocated to
experimental groups.
After receiving one of the framed statements, partic-
ipants were asked to rate the severity of consequences of
FIG. 2. Mean perceived severity of consequences of precipitation change (195% confidence interval) by
(a) communicators choosing the frame for summarizing an uncertain climate projection in study 1 and (b) listeners,
receiving different frames for the uncertain climate projection in study 2. See Table 2 for the five-item scale used for
measuring perceived severity of precipitation change.
TABLE 3. Logistic regression, predicting frame choice (concerned vs unconcerned) in study 1 (communicators). [Notes: BIC 5 615.
We categorized participants by reducing political affiliation to a one-dimensional seven-point left to right scale by placing those who
indicated ‘‘do not know’’ in the middle of the scale (i.e., 4), by placing those who indicated in the ‘‘other’’ category to vote green, socialist,
or communist on the left end of the scale (i.e., 1), and by placing those who indicated to vote constitutional, libertarian, or anarcho-
capitalist on the right end of the scale (i.e., 7). BIC (full model with all interactions and demographics) 5 652.]
Coefficient Standard error Wald statistic p
Intercept 1.04 0.11 9.14 ,0.01
Perceived severity 0.27 0.12 2.23 0.03
Political affiliation 20.26 0.12 22.27 0.02
Environmental values (NEP) 0.25 0.14 1.84 0.07
Numeracy 0.13 0.12 1.08 .0.25
Perceived severity 3 numeracy 20.21 0.12 21.73 0.08
Political affiliation 3 NEP 20.07 0.12 20.62 .0.25
Political affiliation 3 numeracy 20.16 0.12 21.31 0.19
Environmental values 3 numeracy 0.10 0.13 0.77 .0.25
Political affiliation 3 NEP 3 numeracy 0.26 0.12 2.14 0.03
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precipitation change on a five-item scale similar to study
1 (Table 2). Responses across all five items were com-
bined into a single perceived-severity scale (Cronbach’s
a 5 0.92). Listeners were also asked to make a per-
centage estimate about change via the following
question: ‘‘What percent change in annual winter pre-
cipitation would you expect in Greater London in the
2050s, in comparison with the previous decades?’’ (see
also Teigen et al. 2007). The measures assessing pro-
environmental values (M5 3.68, SD5 0.82; Cronbach’s
aNEP5 0.92), political affiliation (M5 3.50, SD5 1.92),
numeracy (M 5 2.35, SD 5 1.19),3 demographics, and
attention check were adopted from study 1. Answers on
perceived severity items and quantitative estimates
were analyzed in R, using the function lm( ) in the
‘‘stats’’ package.
b. Results
Verbal framing of an uncertain interval bound in-
fluences listeners’ perceptions of the projected change: In
line with the prediction and pilot results, listeners ex-
posed to the concerned verbal frame perceived the
consequences of precipitation change to be more severe
than those exposed to an unconcerned frame (Fig. 2b).
Further, higher environmental values predicted greater
perceived severity, whereas higher numeracy was asso-
ciated with lower perceived severity. Perceived severity
was also higher among participants who had both high
environmental values and high numeracy (frame
received 3 NEP 3 numeracy; Table 4). A full model
including all interactions and demographic variables as
main effects produced similar result patterns but re-
sulted in poorer fit to the data. This was indicated by
the BIC, which increased from 1074 to 1081. Findings
were robust when including all participants (N 5 456).
Further, results were similar to pilot results (appendixes
E and F).
Similarly in line with results of the pilot study, the
numeric estimate of the percentage precipitation change
in listeners was not affected by the verbal frame received
(average predictions in each group: Mconcerned_frame 5
29.37, SD5 13.43, andMunconcerned_frame5 27.91, SD5
10.71; see Table 5). We predicted numerical estimates
with a linear regression model, similar to the model
applied to perceived severity of consequences. Partici-
pants tended to make higher estimates when they were
low in numeracy. A regression model including de-
mographic variables showed a similar pattern and ad-
ditionally indicated that older [b 5 20.20 (0.05), p 5
0.01] and more highly educated participants [b 5 20.10
(0.05), p 5 0.04] made lower estimates.
4. General discussion
When participants were asked to communicate an
uncertain projection on precipitation change due to
climate change, they selected a verbal frame that
matched their perceptions of the severity of future cli-
mate change consequences (study 1). Listeners exposed
to a concerned rather than unconcerned verbal frame
for the same projection in turn perceived the conse-
quences of precipitation change to be more severe
(study 2). These findings align with a set of pilot studies
conducted in 2013, and suggest that phrases commonly
used to frame numerical information from climate
sciences may reveal and influence individuals’ percep-
tions of climate change consequences. Importantly, the
alignment between underlying beliefs and selected
frame does not imply that it is exactly the prior beliefs
we assessed that caused frame selection, but merely
demonstrates that frame choices and these beliefs are
correlated. Our results also suggest that how verbal
summaries of numerical confidence intervals are framed
can influence perceptions. These framing effects of the
logically nonequivalent frames studied here are similar
to more traditional framing effects of logically equiva-
lent frames. These results are important because, in
everyday language, framing extends beyond the clean,
logically equivalent frames previously investigated in
the literature.
To assess the role of more general underlying beliefs
about climate change independent of personal experi-
ences, the scenario employed here focused on Greater
London. This likely reduced the probability that
U.S.-based participants themselves experienced climate
change consequences affecting the area. Experience of
climate change consequences has been shown to affect
perceptions and beliefs of climate change (Bruine de
Bruin et al. 2014) and may thus shape perceptions of
frames. For example, previous research suggests that
framing effects in the context of climate change may
depend on how ‘‘close’’ participants perceive the impact
to be (Spence and Pidgeon 2010; Scannell and Gifford
2013; McDonald et al. 2015), although this may not al-
ways lead to more accurate risk perceptions and adap-
tive behaviors (McDonald et al. 2015).
We found that political affiliation predicted frame
choice in study 1. This is in line with previous studies that
found associations between political affiliation and
3Numeracy scores were distributed as follows. 1: 38%; 2: 24%;
3: 17%; 4: 26%, wehre 1 indicates very low numeracy and 4 very
high levels of numeracy. See Cokely et al. (2012) for categorization
of participants according to answers in the adaptive version of the
Berlin Numeracy Test.
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belief in and perceived risk of climate change (Dunlap
et al. 2016; Hornsey et al. 2016). Pro-environmental
values were only weakly associated with frame choice,
while previous work suggested a relationship between
this measure and beliefs about climate change. How-
ever, the regression model included perceived severity,
which is strongly correlated with pro-environmental
values (r 5 0.49; p , 0.01), which might explain this
disparity.
In study 2, environmental values were associated with
perceived severity of precipitation change among listeners.
This is in line with literature indicating relationships
among values, political affiliation, and climate change
risk perceptions [see Corner et al. (2014) for a summary].
We did not observe an interaction between frame received
and political affiliation, which might have indicated that
the concerned frame might have influenced perceptions
of Democrats more than those of Republicans. Higher
numeracy did not reduce the impact of frames in study 2.
In other words, the highly numerate were equally likely to
express perceptions of severity that were in line with the
verbal frames to which they were exposed. In previous
TABLE 5. Linear regression, predicting quantitative estimates of precipitation change, dependent on frame received, environmental
values (NEP), political affiliation and levels of numeracy in study 2 (listeners). [Notes: BIC5 1146;R2 (adj.)5 0.10. See Table 3 in study 1
for the recategorization procedure of participants who indicated ‘‘do not know’’ or ‘‘other’’ on the political affiliation scale. BIC (full
model with demographics) 5 1147; R2 (adj.) 5 0.11.]
Coefficient Standard error t value p
Intercept 20.01 0.08 20.15 .0.25
Frame received 0.07 0.11 0.64 .0.25
Environmental values (NEP) 0.13 0.08 1.61 0.11
Political affiliation 20.07 0.08 20.84 .0.25
Numeracy 20.22 0.08 22.75 0.01
Frame received 3 NEP 20.03 0.11 20.29 .0.25
Frame received 3 political affiliation 0.08 0.11 20.67 .0.25
Frame received 3 numeracy 20.03 0.11 20.26 ..25
Political affiliation 3 NEP 0.08 0.07 1.21 0.23
Political affiliation 3 numeracy 0.07 0.08 0.79 .0.25
NEP 3 numeracy 0.06 0.09 0.74 .0.25
Frame received 3 NEP 3 political affiliation 20.03 0.09 20.31 .0.25
Frame received 3 NEP 3 numeracy 0.08 0.11 0.70 .0.25
Frame received 3 political affiliation 3 numeracy 20.05 0.11 20.48 .0.25
NEP 3 political affiliation 3 numeracy 0.01 0.07 0.20 .0.25
Frame received 3 NEP 3 political affiliation 3 numeracy 20.09 0.10 20.90 .0.25
TABLE 4. Linear regression, predicting perceived severity of consequences, dependent on frame received, environmental values, po-
litical affiliation, and levels of numeracy in study 2 (listeners). [Notes: BIC 5 1074; R2 (adj.) 5 0.24. See Table 3 in study 1 for the
recategorization procedure of participants who indicated ‘‘do not know’’ or ‘‘other’’ on the political affiliation scale. BIC (full model with
demographics) 5 1081; R2 (adj.) 5 0.20.]
Coefficient Standard error t value p
Intercept 20.20 0.07 22.74 0.01
Frame received 0.33 0.09 3.35 ,0.01
Political affiliation 20.02 0.05 20.31 .0.25
Environmental values (NEP) 0.45 0.05 6.12 ,0.01
Numeracy 20.21 0.07 22.93 ,0.01
Frame received 3 political affiliation 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.89
Frame received 3 NEP 20.07 0.10 20.71 .0.25
Frame received 3 numeracy 20.04 0.10 20.43 .0.25
Political affiliation 3 NEP 20.05 0.06 20.84 .0.25
Political affiliation 3 numeracy 0.02 0.08 0.19 .0.25
NEP 3 numeracy 0.01 0.08 0.06 .0.25
Frame received 3 political affiliation 3 NEP 0.03 0.09 0.38 .0.25
Frame received 3 NEP 3 numeracy 0.21 0.10 1.97 0.05
Frame received 3 political affiliation 3 numeracy 20.01 0.10 20.12 .0.25
Political affiliation 3 NEP 3 numeracy 20.01 0.07 20.20 .0.25
Frame received 3 political affiliation 3 NEP 3 numeracy 20.09 0.09 21.00 .0.25
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research, Peters et al. (2006) showed a relationship
between framing effects and numeracy. In that study,
however, the frames were logically equivalent, whereas
in ours they were not. This makes sense, as we would
not necessarily expect for numeracy to ‘‘protect’’
against framing effects when the expressions are not
logically equivalent. It may further indicate that, while
logically nonequivalent frames of the same numerical
information may influence listeners with varying
numeracy levels in the usual way, numeracy may no
longer be a moderator of these framing effects. Yet
interestingly, in study 1, the highly numerate generally
perceived the consequences of increased precipitation
to be less severe.
While the verbal frames influenced perceived severity
in study 2, quantitative estimates of changes in pre-
cipitation due to climate change did not differ between
experimental conditions. This also held true for pilot
study 2 and was the case even though these quantitative
estimates were moderately correlated with perceived
severity. This result differs from prior research showing
that the directionality of verbal frames affects numeric
estimates (Budescu et al. 2003; Teigen et al. 2007; Hohle
and Teigen 2018). Future research should thus in-
vestigate the way in which perceptions measured more
qualitatively (e.g., perceived severity of climate change
impacts, as used in the present research) are related
to more quantitative estimates (precise projections
of the impact), and how each in turn shapes support
for climate change mitigation and adaptation policy.
In everyday conversations, the type and strength of
frames used might vary. When summarizing a climate
projection, individuals might choose other verbal
frames than the ones studied here and specified in, for
example, the UKCP09 outlet (Murphy et al. 2010; see
appendix H). Asking participants in an open-ended
task to summarize a projection in their own words
would enable assessment of the variability and strength
of verbal frames used for climate change impacts in
conversations and public media outlets. Their choices
will likely be associated with their underlying beliefs
about climate change.
Furthermore, verbal probabilities may serve other
functions in social interaction than the ones described.
Communicators, when choosing a verbal frame express-
ing higher concern, might adhere to listeners’ preferences
for ‘‘worst case’’ scenarios (Teigen et al. 2007). More
generally, omitting numbers in climate projections might
indicate less responsibility when the projection turns out
to be wrong (‘‘fuzzy cover hypothesis’’; Erev and Cohen
1990) but still leave room for expressing underlying be-
liefs. Listeners, in turn, may perceive a verbal probability
statement as a way of protecting either the communicator
or the listener from a too-strong statement that may be
less well received but less frequent for simply expressing a
likelihood (‘‘face management’’; Juanchich et al. 2012).
5. Conclusions
Different verbal frames used in climate communica-
tions may reveal and influence how individuals perceive
climate change consequences. This suggests that these
verbal summaries of numeric information are neither
neutrally chosen nor neutrally interpreted (Scheufele
2014). As a result, verbal framing of uncertain pro-
jections (e.g., by the media, online blogs, policymakers,
and peers) likely reveals and influences public percep-
tions of climate change, contributing to polarization on
the issue: initially very subtle verbal nuances in climate
change communications express different levels of per-
ceived severity. Those levels might be amplified and
reinforced when propagated through chains of in-
dividuals, in particular when they share a similar view-
point (Moussaïd et al. 2015). This limits our ability to
achieve a basic level of agreement on scientific facts, and
it could continue to preclude necessary mitigation and
adaptation behaviors.
Our results, together with previous work on com-
munications of climate information, motivate several
recommendations for facilitating a more neutral com-
munication of uncertain intervals around climate change
projections. One is to accompany verbally described
probability levels with their numerical equivalents
(Budescu et al. 2014). This decreases variability in how
verbally described probability levels are interpreted and
likely also the influence of different verbal frames.
Furthermore, simple graphical formats may enhance
understanding (Galesic et al. 2016; Garcia-Retamero
and Cokely 2014; Joslyn et al. 2013; Stephens et al.
2012). These should reflect cognitive design principles
that enhance ease of understanding of graphs (Harold
et al. 2017). Empirical studies need to assess how well
climate information in different numerical and graphical
formats is understood by different target audiences
(Galesic et al. 2016; Harold et al. 2017). Such strate-
gies could produce a more accurate picture of projected
changes and associated uncertainties if they are un-
derstandable and simple enough to resonate with
beliefs of both listeners and communicators. Ideally, this
allows for a better informed and more neutral debate
about complex and uncertain scientific issues such as
climate change.
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APPENDIX A
Study Materials as Used in Study 1 and Study 2
Thank you for participating in our study!
In this study, we examine how people think about
the effects of climate change on first-world countries.
For this purpose you will complete several simple cal-
culations, and interpret information presented in graphs
and short statements in the way thatmakesmost sense to
you. Your data will be collected completely anony-
mously using an online survey service. The researchers,
AmazonMechanical Turk, and the online survey service
will have no way of linking your data with your personal
identity.
The Max Planck Institute for Human Development
and the University of Konstanz are institutions that pro-
motes scientific research. Our work adheres strictly
to regulations governing protection of privacy. The
information requested in the study will be kept confi-
dential and archived and scientifically processed in ac-
cordance with the Data Privacy Act. Personal data will
not be passed on to any third parties. The data will be
used solely for research purposes and solely within or in
cooperation with both institutions. Personal contact data
and experimental datawill be stored separately from each
other andhandledwith utmost discretion. Participation in
the study is voluntary and you are able to end your par-
ticipation at any time. You can revoke your consent to
use your data at any time from that date forward.
The study will last approximately 20min. You will be
paid $2 for completing the study. If you leave the study
prior to completion, you will not receive payment.
I have read and accept the terms and conditions
listed above and consent to participate in this study
(prerequisite for participating in the study)
[ ] Yes
[COMMUNICATORS]
Please read the following information carefully before
moving on to the questions.
When thinking about what climate change means for
people, one question is how it will affect towns and cities.
Governments, businesses, individuals, and other groups can
use this information to devise plans for the future devel-
opment of their community. For example, if severe hurri-
canes are likely to occur more frequently near a particular
coastal city, that community might prepare by building
better levees, improving its evacuation plan, and so on.
The 2009 UK Climate Projections (UKCP09) use
available climate data to make predictions about the
effects of climate change on Great Britain.
Because no one knows exactly how policies, technol-
ogies, individual behaviors, and other factors will change
TABLE B1. Sample characteristics of pilot study 1 and pilot study 2. In each subsample, participants were excluded because they either did
not complete questionnaires or because in advance of our studies, they participated in pilot studies and were thus too familiar with the
experimental materials. In a next step, we excluded those who indicated ‘‘don’t know’’ or ‘‘other’’ on the political affiliation scale. When
comparing remaining to excluded communicators (pilot study1), no statistical differenceoccurredwith regard to age [t(30)5 0.04, p5 1]. The
overall level of educationwas lower [t(40)523, p5 0.01].With regard tomeasures used, they expressed slightly lower environmental values
[t(30)522, p5 0.05] but did not differ on any of the other measures (all p. 0.3). When comparing excluded listeners to remaining listeners
(pilot study 2), no statistical difference occurred with regard to age [t(20)5 0.5, p5 0.06]. The overall level of education was lower [t(100)5
210, p , 0.01]. With regard to measures used, excluded listeners did not differ in any of the other measures used (all p . 0.1).
Study 1: Communicators Study 2: Listeners
Final sample (N 5 298) Excluded participants Final sample (N 5 393) Excluded participants
Mage (years) 33.3 (SD 5 11) 33.4 (SD 5 11.1) 32.5 (SD 5 10.3) 33.05 (SD 5 9.23)
Percentage male 61 57 58 57
Levels of education (%) High school or lower: 14 High school or lower: 3 High school or lower: 13 High school or lower: 8
College: 73 College: 22 College: 76 College: 8
Graduate school: 13 Graduate school: 2 Graduate school: 11 Graduate school: 5
MEnvironmental_values (SD) 3.26 (0.70) 3.24 (0.69) 3.51 (0.66) 2.19 (1.21)
MPolitical_affiliation (SD) 3.12 (1.67) 2.07 (1.52) 3.20 (1.60) 2.00 (1.38)
MNumeracy (SD) 2.28 (1.17) 2.22 (1.05) 2.43 (1.16) 2.19 (1.21)
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in the coming decades, because some aspects of the
climate system are incompletely understood and be-
cause natural variability occurs in the climate system,
there is some uncertainty in these projections.
Consider the graph below as an example very similar
to predictions by the UKCP09. It suggests that by the
2050s, the amount of winter precipitation in Greater
London is likely to have increased in comparison to a
historical baseline—but by exactly how much it will in-
crease cannot be known beforehand.
Heavier and more frequent winter rainfall events could
lead to flooding, which could result in injuries and fatali-
ties, damage to property and infrastructure, disease spread,
delayed economic development, and other consequences.
The following statements put the above chart into
words. Imagine that you are explaining the prediction to a
friend. Your friend, who lives in London, is deciding
whether to vote for city infrastructure that is more
resilient to flooding. This would help the city adapt to the
effects of climate change, but would require significant
government spending. Which statement would you
choose?
‘‘A recent report predicts that because of climate
change, winter precipitation will increase in Greater
London. Compared to a historical baseline, by the 2050s,
winter precipitation
a. Could have increased by as much as 33%.’’
b. Is very unlikely to have increased by more than
33%.’’
[Measures–COMMUNICATORS]
With what severity do you think London will experi-
ence these potential consequences of flooding by the
2050s? (For each, a 7-point scale, ranging from ‘‘No
severity at all’’ to ‘‘Extreme severity’’.)
TABLE C1. Logistic regression, predicting frame choice (unconcerned vs concerned) in pilot study 1 (communicators). Notes: BIC 5
358. A dominance analysis indicated that perceived severity dominated all other predictors, accounting for 30% of the model’s overall fit
(see appendix D). Pro-environmental values were the second most important predictor, accounting for 17% of overall fit. For the pilot
data, we ran the same logistic regression on a larger sample, including communicators, who, when asked about their political affiliation,
indicated the category ‘‘don’t know’’ or ‘‘other.’’ In this larger sample,N5 21 participants (7%) did so. We categorized these participants
by reducing political affiliation to a one-dimensional seven-point left–right scale by placing those who indicated ‘‘do not know’’ in the
middle of the scale (i.e., 4), by placing those who indicated in the ‘‘other’’ category to vote green, socialist, or communist on the left end of
the scale (i.e., 1), and by placing those who indicated to vote constitutional, libertarian, or anarcho-capitalist on the right end of the scale
(i.e., 7). Including those participants in all reported analyses did not alter displayed results. BIC (full model with all interactions and
demographics) 5 399.
Coefficient Standard error Wald statistic p
Intercept 1.23 0.15 8.29 ,0.01
Perceived severity 0.36 0.16 2.33 0.02
Political affiliation 20.13 0.15 20.84 .0.25
Environmental values (NEP) 0.30 0.16 1.80 0.07
Numeracy 0.18 0.15 1.16 0.25
Perceived severity 3 numeracy 20.10 0.15 20.73 0.47
Political affiliation 3 NEP 20.04 0.16 20.27 .0.25
Political affiliation 3 numeracy 0.14 0.16 0.85 ..25
Political affiliation 3 NEP 3 numeracy 20.26 0.18 21.48 0.14
Environmental values 3 numeracy 20.09 0.16 20.55 ..25
TABLE D1. Dominance analysis results for logistic regression predictors in main and pilot study 1.
Predictor
Main study 1 Pilot study 1
Dominance
Standardized
dominance Rank Dominance
Standardized
dominance Rank
Perceived severity 0.03 0.49 1 0.02 0.30 1
Political affiliation 0.02 0.30 5 0.004 0.06 2
Environmental values (NEP) 0.0009 0.02 2 0.01 0.17 8
Numeracy 0.0004 0.01 7 0.01 0.12 4
Perceived severity 3 numeracy 0.002 0.03 4 0.01 0.06 7
Political affiliation 3 NEP 0.0001 0.002 8 0.0004 0.01 9
Political affiliation 3 numeracy 0.001 0.14 6 0.01 0.08 6
Environmental values 3 numeracy 0.0007 0.01 3 0.01 0.06 5
Political affiliation 3 NEP x numeracy 0.0001 0.001 9 0.01 0.14 3
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a. Loss of income and delayed economic development
b. Contamination and disease from flood and sewer
water
c. Direct damage to property, infrastructure and
utilities
d. Loss of life and personal injury
[LISTENERS]
Please read the following information carefully before
moving on to the questions.
When thinking about what climate change means for
people, one question is how it will affect towns and cities.
Governments, businesses, individuals, and other groups can
TABLE E1. Linear regression, predicting perceived severity of consequences, dependent on frame received, environmental values
(NEP), political affiliation, and levels of numeracy in pilot study 2 (listeners). Notes: BIC5 1123. We ran the same linear regression on a
larger sample, including communicators, who, when asked about their political affiliation, indicated the category ‘‘don’t know’’ or
‘‘other.’’ In this larger sample, N 5 14 participants (3.4%) did so. We categorized these participants by reducing political affiliation to a
one-dimensional seven-point left-to-right scale by placing those who indicated ‘‘do not know’’ in themiddle of the scale (i.e., 4), by placing
those who indicated in the ‘‘other’’ category to vote green, socialist, or communist on the left end of the scale (i.e., 1), and by placing those
who indicated to vote constitutional, libertarian, or anarcho-capitalist on the right end of the scale (i.e., 7). Including those participants did
not alter displayed results. BIC (full model with all interactions and demographics) 5 1169.
Coefficient Standard error Wald statistic p
Intercept 20.13 0.07 21.88 0.06
Frame received 0.23 0.10 2.34 0.02
Political affiliation 20.16 0.05 23.20 ,0.01
Environmental values (NEP) 0.17 0.05 3.47 ,0.01
Numeracy 20.31 0.07 24.20 ,0.01
Frame received 3 numeracy 0.15 0.10 1.55 0.12
Political affiliation 3 NEP 20.01 0.05 20.19 .0.25
Political affiliation 3 numeracy 20.04 0.05 20.70 .0.25
NEP 3 numeracy 0.10 0.05 2.05 0.04
Political affiliation 3 NEP 3 numeracy 0.04 0.04 0.99 .0.25
FIG. F1. Mean perceived severity of consequences of precipitation change (195% confidence interval) by
(a) communicators choosing a verbal frame for communicating an uncertain climate projection in pilot study 1 and
(b) listeners receiving different verbal frames for the uncertain projection in pilot study 2. In the pilot studies, mean
perceived severity of consequences following precipitation change was measured with a four-item scale, ranging
from 1 (‘‘No severity at all’’) to 7 (‘‘Extreme severity’’) (see Table 1). We included the fifth item measuring overall
perceived severity into the main studies in order to reduce ceiling effects observed here.
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use this information to devise plans for the future de-
velopment of their community. For example, if severe
hurricanes are likely to occur more frequently near a
particular coastal city, that community might prepare by
building better levees, improving its evacuation plan,
and so on.
In Great Britain, some are concerned that climate
change will lead to more winter precipitation. Heavier
and more frequent winter rainfall events could lead
to flooding, which could result in injuries and fatali-
ties, damage to property and infrastructure, disease
spread, delayed economic development, and other
consequences.
In 2010, London’s mayor consulted the elected
London Assembly on the issue of climate change.
Imagine that one assembly member, summarizing evi-
dence from a reputable source, stated:
[Concerned verbal frame]
1. ‘‘By the 2050s, annual winter precipitation inGreater
London could have increased by as much as 33%.’’
[Unconcerned verbal frame]
‘‘By the 2050s, annual winter precipitation in Greater
London is veryunlikely tohave increasedbymore than33%.’’
[Measures–LISTENERS]
If increased flood risk were judged to be of significant
concern, it might influence the design and updating of
infrastructure, the construction of new buildings, the
development of emergency response plans, and so on.
Please answer the following questions using the as-
sembly member’s statement and data alone. There is no
right answer—your gut instinct is what matters to us.
TABLEG1. Perceived severity of listeners in main study 1 by levels of environmental values, political affiliation, and levels of numeracy.
For the purpose of this display, participants’ average value on the NEP scale and continuous answers on the political affiliation scale were
binarized using a median split.
Levels of numeracy NEP Political affiliation Mean perceived severity (SE)
1 Low Republican 5.60 (—)
Democrat 5.05 (1.08)
High Republican 4.43 (0.13)
Democrat 5.0 (0.12)
2 Low Republican —
Democrat 3.80 (0)
High Republican 4.35 (0.21)
Democrat 4.88 (0.15)
3 Low Republican —
Democrat 5.10 (0.10)
High Republican 3.92 (0.27)
Democrat 4.59 (0.18)
4 Low Republican 4.27 (1.18)
Democrat 5.0 (—)
High Republican 3.90 (0.18)
Democrat 4.68 (0.12)
TABLE H1. Media quotations, illustrating the use of different verbal frames for summarizing uncertain numerical climate projections.
Media quote Reference
‘‘Study finds top fossil fuel producers’ emissions
responsible for as much as half of global surface
temperature increase (. . .)’’
https://www.ucsusa.org/press/2017/study-finds-top-fossil-fuel-
producers-emissions-responsible-much-half-global-surface#.WvH_Ly-
B3OQ; accessed on 17 May 2018
‘‘Researchers expected to find a 6 percent increase in Hurricane
Harvey rainfall totals, but instead found that climate
change increased those totals by at least 19 percent and
as much as 38 percent.’’
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/global-warming-tied-to-
hurricane-harvey/
‘‘According to an IPCC report, if greenhouse gas emissions
remain unchecked, global sea levels could rise by as much
as 3 feet (0.9 meters) by 2100.’’
https://www.livescience.com/37057-global-warming-effects.html
‘‘It now rains considerably more in winter almost everywhere
in Germany; in some cases, precipitation volumes have
increased by as much as 30 percent in the cold season. In
contrast, summers in many Federal States have become dryer.’’
https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/how-climate-change-
affecting-germany
212 WEATHER , CL IMATE , AND SOC IETY VOLUME 11
1. What percent change in annual winter precipitation
would you expect in Greater London, in compari-
son with previous decades, in the 2050s? ____%
2. With what severity do you think London will
experience these potential consequences of
flooding by the 2050s? (For each, a 7-point scale,
ranging from ‘‘No severity at all’’ to ‘‘Extreme
severity’’.)
a. Loss of income and delayed economic development
b. Contamination and disease from flood and sewer
water
c. Direct damage to property, infrastructure and
utilities
d. Loss of life and personal injury
APPENDIX B
Sample Characteristics of Pilot Study 1 and
Pilot Study 2
Table B1 shows sample characteristics for pilot study
1 (communicators) and pilot study 2 (listeners).
APPENDIX C
Logistic Regression, Predicting Frame Choice
(Concerned vs Unconcerned) in Pilot Study 1
(Communicators)
Table C1 shows coefficients from a logistic regression
model, predicting frame choices in pilot study 1.
APPENDIX D
Dominance Analysis Results for Logistic Regression
Predictors in Main and Pilot Study 1
Table D1 shows dominance analysis results for the
main study and pilot study 1.
APPENDIX E
Linear Regression, Predicting Perceived Severity of
Consequences, Dependent on Verbal Frame
Received, Environmental Values (NEP), Political
Affiliation, and Levels of Numeracy in Pilot Study 2
(Listeners)
Table E1 shows coefficients from a linear regression
model, predicting perceived severity of consequences in
pilot study 2.
APPENDIX F
Mean Perceived Severity of Consequences in Study 1
(Communicators) and Study 2 (Listeners) by Verbal
Frame
Figure F1 shows mean perceived severity of conse-
quences in pilot study 1 (communicators) and pilot study
2 (listeners).
APPENDIX G
Mean Perceived Severity of Listeners in Main Study
1 by Levels of Environmental Values, Political
Affiliation, and Numeracy
Table G1 reports mean values of perceived severity
by levels of numeracy, environmental values (median
split), and political affiliation (median split).
APPENDIX H
Exemplary Media Quotations Using Different
Verbal Frames Used for Summarizing Numerical
Climate Projections
Table H1 provides examples for media quotations,
illustrating the use of different verbal frames for sum-
marizing uncertain numerical climate projections.
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